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or statutory provisions relative to cumulative
voting are by no means a recent development in the law pertaining to corporations. In at least three states provisions of this
type were in force prior to 1880.1 It is hoped, however, that
somewhat recent enactments of this type of legislation by -Congress with respect to national banking associations, 2 and by the
Minnesota Legislature with respect to so-called business corporations, 3 will give this general discussion of the subject of cumulative voting a timely complexion.
Generally speaking, cumulative voting provisions pertain solely
to elections of directors, trustees or managers of corporations by
the holders of stock therein.4 Most of the enactments dealing with
the subject fall into one or the other of two broad classifications,
namely, provisions which are mandatory in the sense that the enactment grants the privilege to stockholders of all corporations within
its purview, irrespective of the scope of charter or by-laws,5 and
provisions which are permissive in that charter or by-law grants
of the cumulative voting privilege are authorized at the option of
the incorporators or stockholders. Within the "mandatory" class
may be included cumulative voting enactments of seventeen states6
ONSTITUTIONAL

-tOf the New York and Minnesota Bars.

*Of the New York and Michigan Bars.
'Illinois, Constitution of 1870, art. XI, sec. 3; Pennsylvania, Consti-

tution of 1874, art. XVI, sec. 4; California, Constitution of 1879, art. XII,
sec. 12.

2Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, sec. 19, 48 Stat. at L 186; amending U. S.

Rev. Stat., sec. 5144 (12 U.S.C.A. sec. 61, 1 Mason's U.S. Code, Title 12,
sec. 61).
3

4Minnesota,

Laws 1933, ch. 300, sec. 25.

An exception to this general rule is the provision of the Michigan
statutes (Michigan, Public Acts 1931, Act No. 327, sec. 13) which authorizes
cumulative voting on the question of removing a director before the
of the term for which he was elected.
expiration
5
See infra, footnotes 30-34 and text.

GArizona, Constitution, art. XIV, sec. 10 and Rev. Code of 1928,
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and the Territory of Alaska 7 and congressional legislation applicable to national banking associations.8 Within the "permissive"10
9
classification fall enactments of fifteen states and Puerto Rico.
The North Carolina cumulative voting statute appears to straddle
the classifications just enumerated."- Apparently none of the remaining states has a statute expressly relating to cumulative voting, although in two instances there is some indication that, as a
matter of practice, corporations may make provision for the exer2

cise of the privilege.1

Part II, ch. 14, sec. 585; Arkansas, Laws 1931, Act 255, art. V, sec. 32;
California, Civil Code, sec. 320; Idaho, Constitution, art. XI, sec. 4 and
Code 1932, Title 29, sec. 29-133; Illinois, Constitution, art. XI, sec. 3 and
Rev. Stat. (Cahill) 1933, ch. 32, sec. 28; Kansas, Rev. Stat. 1923, sec.
17-235; Kentucky, Constitution, sec. 207 and Carroll's Kentucky Stat.,
1930, sec. 552; Mississippi, Constitution, sec. 194 and Code 1930, sec. 4147;
Missouri, Constitution, art. XII, sec. 6 and Rev. Stat. 1929, sec. 4536;
Montana, Constitution, art. XV, sec. 4 and Rev. Codes 1935, sec. 5937;
Nebraska, Constitution, art. XII, sec. 5 and Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 24-117;
North Dakota, Constitution, art. 7, sec. 135 as amended, 1918, art. XXIII
and Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 4540; Ohio, Gen. Code 1931, sec. 8623-50;
Pennsylvania, Constitution, art. XVI, sec. 4 and Laws 1933, Act No. 106,
sec. 505; South Carolina, Constitution, art. IX, sec. 11 and Civil Code
1932, sec. 7680; South Dakota, Constitution, art. XVII, sec. 5 but see
Rev. Code 1919, sec. 8787, as amended Laws 1921, ch. 156; Washington,
Remington's Rev. Stat. 1932, sec. 3803-28 or Pierce's Code 1933, sec.
4592-58; West Virginia, Constitution, art. 11, sec. 4 and Code 1931, ch.
31, art. 1, sec. 66; Wyoming, Rev. Stat. 1931, sec. 28-117.
7
Comp. Laws of 1933, Title 2, ch. XI, art. II, secs. 911 and 934.
8United States, Rev. Stat., sec. 5144 (12 U.S.C.A. sec. 61, 1 Mason's
U.S. Code, tit. 12, sec. 61) as amended.
gColorado, Comp. Laws 1921, secs. 2243 and 2263 as amended respectively by Laws 1931, ch. 70, secs. 4 and 8; Delaware, Rev. Code 1935, ch.
65, sec. 17; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, sec. 6554; Indiana, Burns
Ann. Stat. 1933, Title 25, sec. 25-207; Louisiana, Laws 1928, Act 250, sec.
32; Maryland, Bagby's Ann. Code 1924, art. 23, sec. 24; Michigan, Public
Acts 1931, Act No. 327, sec. 32; Minnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 300, sec. 25;
Nevada, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 1629; New Jersey, 2 Comp. Stats. 1910,
Corporations sec. 36-a; New Mexico, Ann. Comp. Stat. 1929, ch. 32, sec.
32-141; New York, Consolidated Laws (Cahill) 1931-35 Supp., ch. 60
(Stock Corporation Law) sec. 49, as amended Laws 1935, ch. 653; Rhode
Island, Gen. Laws 1923, ch. 248, sec. 23; Tennessee, Code 1932, Title 9,
ch. 5,0 secs. 3741 and 3886; Virginia, Code 1930, sec. 3798.
' Rev. Stat. 1913, sec. 428.
"Under section 1173 of Michie's 1931 Code cumulative voting is permitted only when there is a grant of that privilege in the corporation's
charter except, as and unless the stock records of the corporation show that
25 per cent or more of the stock entitled to vote is owned or controlled
by one person in which event the right of any stockholder to cumulate his
votes apparently becomes absolute upon compliance with certain formalities,
irrespective of any charter provision.
12Apparently in Maine cumulative voting may be authorized by the
by-laws under Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 56, sec. 22 as amended Laws 1931, ch.
155 (see The Corporation Manual 1937, John S. Parker, Editor, page
709). In Utah, apparently, somewhat general statutory provisions (Rev.
Stat. 1933, secs. 18-2-5 and 18-2-39) are interpreted to authorize inclusion
in a corporation's charter of a provision relating to cumulative voting
(see The Corporation Manual 1937, John S. Parker, Edtor, page 1807).

CUMULATIVE VOTING

In requiring or making it possible that stockholders be accorded
the privilege of voting cumulatively, the design of legislators undoubtedly has been to afford minority interests the opportunity
to secure representation on the board of directors18 and thus, as
one court has observed, enable the minority interests to "obtain
direct contact with the business of the corporation, and its management, and observe the conduct of the corporate officers whom the
directors may employ."'14 As another court has aptly pointed out,
however, "the scheme does not pretend to assufe to a minority a
representation in any event."'15 The enjoyment of the right is a
thing incident to each share of stock, but the effectiveness of its
exercise depends, as later illustrated, upon several factors such
as the number of shares voted cumulatively in the same way, the
method of distributing the votes and the number of directors to be
elected.
The typical cumulative voting provision permits each shareholder "to vote the number of shares owned by him for as many
persons as there are directors to be elected, or to cumulate such
shares and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares shall equal, or
to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit. . . ."' The choice or option afforded by
this type of statute to the holder of a single share was rather aptly
illustrated by the Pennsylvania court which, after calculating that
at an election of six directors a single share would be entitled to
an aggregate of six votes, went on to point out that the holder of
that share "may cast those six votes for a single one of the candidates, or he may distribute them to two or more of such candidates
as he may think proper. He may cast two ballots for each of three
of the proposed directors, three for two, or two for one and one
each for four others, or finally, he may cast one vote for each of
the six candidates."' 1
13Wright v. Central California Water Co., (1885) 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac.
70; Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, (1929) 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl.
255; Matter of Jamaica Consumers Ice Company, (1920) 190 App. Div.
739, 180 N. Y. S. 384, affirmed without opinion (1920) 229 N. Y. 516, 129
N. E. 897; State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, (1905) 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W.
872, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 121; State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100
Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E. 87; Commonwealth ex rel. O'Shea v. Flannery,

(1902)4 203 Pa. St. 28, 52 At. 129.

87.
255.

1 State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919)
5

100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E.

1 Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, (1929)

17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl.

IOU. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5144 (12 U.S.C.A. sec. 61, 1 Mason's U.S.
Code,7 tit. 12, sec. 61), as amended.
1 Pierce v. Commonwealth, (1883) 104 Pa. St. 150; see also Schmidt
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Instances are not lacking in which the courts have been called
upon to decide the validity under the Constitution of the United
States of attempted applications of state constitutional or statutory
provisions for cumulative voting to the affairs of corporations
chartered prior to adoption of such provisions. The problem
seems to revolve somewhat about the doctrine of the historic case
of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,'I which established that a charter from a state to a corporation constituted a
contract within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution of
the United States which prohibits passage by a state of any law
impairing the obligation of contract, 19 and to depend for its solution, in part at least, upon the existence or non-existence of a
so-called "reserved powers" clause which certain passages from
20
Mr. Justice Story's concurring opinion in that case inspired
many states to incorporate in their constitutions or statutes in
order to avoid the limiting effect of the decision upon their
powers." The fact that a corporate charter was granted subject
to reservation on the part of a state of power to alter, amend or
repeal the same has been held to render cumulative voting legislation passed subsequent to the grant validly applicable to the
affairs of the corporation under the constitution of the United
States." On the other hand, if the power to alter, amend or
repeal corporate charters or powers be not reserved by the state
at the time a charter is granted to a corporation, it would seem
that the constitution of the United States renders invalid any
attempt to apply cumulative voting legislation enacted subsequent
3
In Minnesota
to such grant to the affairs of the corporation.'
v. Mitchell, (1897) 101 Ky. 570, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 763, 41 S. W. 929, 72
Am. St. Rep. 427.
18(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629.

'gArt. I, sec. 10, cl. 1.

20"In my judgment, it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature
which takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a
private corporation, or its corporate officers, or which restrains or controls
the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, without
its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that charter. If the legislature mean to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant.

(at p. 711.)

21See Greenwood v. Freight Company, (1881)

961.

105 U. S. 13, 26 L. Ed.

2Looker v. Maynard, (1900) 179 U. S. 46, 21 Sup. Ct. 21, 45 L. Ed.
79; Gregg v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co., (1901) 164 Mo. 616, 65
S. W. 312; Cross v. West Virginia Cent. & P. Ry. Co., (1891) 35 W. Va.
174, 12 S. E. 1071.
23State ex rel. Haeussler v. Greer, (1883) 78 Mo. 188; Smith v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (C.C. Kan. 1894) 64 Fed. 272; see Hays v.
Commonwealth, (1876) 82 Pa. St. 518, and Baker's Appeal, (1885) 109
Pa. St. 461.
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where power to alter, amend or repeal corporate charters apparently was not reserved until passage in 1933 of the Business Corporations Act,2 ' which also made provision for cumulative voting, the
25
problem of constitutional validity may become important.
It appears to be the rule that express statutory authorization
therefor is a necessary prerequisite to the existence of the cumulative voting privilege. 26 In states where statutes pertaining to the
privilege are of the "permissive" type absolute adherence to the
statutorily defined method of creating the privilege seems to be
essential. For instance, a by-law designed to authorize cumulative voting was held to be ineffective because an applicable statute
contemplated that the privilege be created, if at all, by appropriate
provision in the corporation's charter 27 and it appears that a
general agreement between stockholders likewise might be ineffective in the ordinary situation. 8 Where, however, stockholders by unanimous vote have taken the action required of them
by the enabling statute in order to make provision in the charter
for cumulative voting, but the provision has not become effective
because of the failure of corporate officers to file a certificate or
take other action contemplated by the statute in order to effectuate
the action of stockholders, an agreement or contract between
stockholders may be implied from the unanimous vote which will
permit exercise of the cumulative voting privilege.29
One gathers that the cumulative voting privilege, when once
accorded, cannot be taken away except by authority equal in grade
to that by which the privilege was conferred.30 Consistently with

24Laws
1933, ch. 300, sec. 60.
25
Possibly the absence of reserved power to alter, amend or repeal
corporate charters moved the draftsmen of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act (Laws 1933, ch. 300) to make it applicable in terms to corporations chartered prior to its passage by "consent" of such corporations
(see sec. 61). The extent to which courts might uphold this "consent"
theory involves a number of interesting questions exploration of which will

not be
2 attempted in this article.
tState ex rel. Baumgardner v. Stockley, (1887) 45 Ohio St. 304, 13
N. E. 279; In re Brophy, (1935) 13 N. J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128; see
Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., (1934) 265 N. Y. 416, 193
N. E. 253.

In the light of these authorities some question may be raised

concerning the practice apparently followed in Maine and Utah of making
provision for cumulative voting without express statutory authority (see
supra,
2 7 footnote 12 and text).
1n

28

re Brophy, (1935) 13 N. J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128.

See Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corporation, (1934)

N. Y.
416, 193 N. E. 253.
29

265

Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corporation, (1934) 265 N. Y.

416, 193 N. E. 253.
0

3 See Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, (1929)
Atl. 255.

17 Del. Ch. 39, 147
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this view it has been held that stockholders cannot be deprived of
the right to cumulate their votes granted them by constitutional
or statutory provision through enactment of a by-law 3' or by
resolution passed by a majority vote of shares3 2 or by action on
the part of the majority adjourning the meeting3 3 or as a result of
34
arbitrary action on the part of the chairman of the meeting.
Equally consistent with the aforesaid rule is the Delaware decision
that under the law of that state, which permits corporate charters
to contain cumulative voting provisions, such a provision may be
repealed through amendment of the charter in accordance with
statutorily defined procedure, notwithstanding the objection of
minority interests."
Failure to utilize the right to cumulate votes for directors
over a long period of time does not amount to a waiver, or result
in loss, of the privilege3 6 Nor is the right forfeited by failure
on the part of the stockholder to give notice of his intention to
cumulate in advance of the balloting,3 7 in the absence of statutes
providing to the contrary. 8
The motive controlling the stockholder's decision to cumulate
his votes is apparently not a subject of inqury, one court stating
31

People ex rel. Snapp v. Younger, (1925) 238 Ill. App. 502; see
Tomlin
v. The Farmers & Merchants Bank, (1893) 52 Mo. App. 430.
32
Wright v. Central California Water Co., (1885) 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac.
70; Alliance Co-Operative Insurance Co. v. Gasche, (1914) 93 Kan. 147,
142 Pac. 882; Tomlin v. The Farmers & Merchants Bank, (1893) 52 Mo.
App. 430; Commonwealth ex rel. Oler v. Gutman, (1927) 10 Pa. Dist. &
Co. 606. In the Tomlin Case the court observed that the cumulative voting
right "is one guaranteed by the law, constitutional and statutory, it is
personal to the stockholder," and accordingly "cannot be taken from him
by a3 resolution
or by-law adopted by a majority of shareholders."
3
West Side Hospital v. Steele, (1906) 124 Ill. App. 535.
34
State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E.
87; Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing Co. v. Boggiano, (1903) 202 Ill. 312,
67 N. E. 17.
85Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, (1929) 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl.
255. 3
s Matter of Jamaica Consumers Ice Company, (1920) 190 App. Div.
739, 180 N. Y. S. 384, affirmed without opinion (1920) 229 N. Y. 516, 129
N. E. 897; Commonwealth ex rel. MacCallum v. Acker, (1932) 308 Pa.
St. 29, 162 Atl. 159. In the case last cited the court stated:
"That the members of this fund did not attempt to exercise this right
in the past does not preclude their exercise at this or any time they desire
to do so. The right exists and no basis for an estoppel is shown."
87
Pierce v. Commonwealth, (1883) 104 Pa. St. 150, the court stating
that "we do not see who has the right . . . to compel the voter to say in
advance whether he will or will not use that privilege." Commonwealth ex
rel, Hanrahan v. Smith, (1910) 19 Pa. Dist. 638.
38
Advance warning or notice of intention to cumulate votes is required by the laws of at least three states: Minnesota, Laws 1933, ch.
300, sec. 25; North Carolina, Michie's 1931 Code, sec. 1173; Ohio, Gen.
Code 1931, sec. 8623-50.
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that "it would be a dangerous and far-reaching precedent to permit an inquiry into the motive which is alleged to control or influence the shareholder in making his choice of a directory." 89 It
has also been held immaterial that the privilege of cumulating votes
40
was exercised as a result of influence brought to bear by others.
Where a ballot appears to evidence an intention to vote noncumulatively, the stockholder will not be allowed to prove that he
intended to vote cumulatively. 41
Whether or not exercise of the privilege of cumulating votes
is properly within the limits of the authority of a shareholder's
proxy is a question which does not appear to have been raised
very often. The provisions of the Illinois Constitution and Statutes pertaining to cumulative voting seem to have been interpreted to authorize in terms the exercise of the privilege by
proxy42 and provisions effective in certain other states seem open
to the same interpretation. 43 Even though applicable cumulative
voting statutes do not in terms authorize exercise of the privilege
by proxy, it is difficult to find any substantial basis for an objection to the practice. It is true, of course, that the grant of authority
by the stockholder to his proxy ought to be broad enough to convey the privilege, but language now commonly employed by draftsmen authorizing the proxy to vote for the election of directors
"with all the powers the undersigned would possess if personally
present at said meeting" seems adequate in this connection."
In the very nature of things the cumulative voting system requires that more than one vacancy exist on the board of directors
39Tomlin v. The Farmers & Merchants Bank, (1893) 52 Mo. App. 430;
accord, Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing Company v. Boggiano, (1903) 202
Ill.
312,
67 N. E. 17.
4

oClopton v. Chandler, (1915) 27 Cal. App. 595, 150 Pac. 1012.
4"Commonwealth ex rel. James v. Blatchford, (1876) 21 Pa. Dist. 453.
The doctrine of this case should be distinguished from the rule which
permits shareholders to correct their ballots while the polls are still open
(see infra, footnote 65 and text).
42People ex rel. Snapp v. Younger, (1925) 238 Ill. App. 502 construing constitution, art. XI, sec. 3 and statute now incorporated in Rev. Stat.
1933 as ch. 32, sec. 28.
(Cahill)
43For instance: Arizona, Constitution, art. XIV, sec. 10 and Rev. Code
of 1928, Part II, ch. 14, sec. 585; Arkansas, Laws 1931, Act 255, see. 32;
Idaho, Constitution, art. XI, sec. 4 and Code 1932, Title 29, sec. 29-133;
Missouri, Constitution, art. XII, sec. 6 and Rev. Stat. of 1929, sec. 4536;
West Virginia, Constitution, art. 11, sec. 4 and Code of 1931, ch. 31, art.
I, sec. 66.
44See Forsyth v. Brown, (Pa. 1893) 33 W. N. 72, wherein the court

without discussing the point seems to have validated votes cast on a cumulative basis by proxies who were authorized by stockholders, respectively,
to vote on their behalf "at any election of directors ... as fully as I might
or could were I personally present."
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and that but one ballot be held for the purpose of filling all vacancies. Otherwise, as the California court has pointed out,
"if but one director at a time be balloted for, a majority of the
stockholders could, by combining, cumulate their votes each time
upon a single candidate and elect him; and by thus shaping and
controlling the manner of the election, it would be in the power of
the majority of the stockholders to virtually cancel the votes of the
minority and deprive them of their rights to representation on the
board of directors." 5
In view of this situation it is obvious that a director's election
depends not upon obtaining a number of votes equal to a majority
of the number of shares voted but upon obtaining a plurality of
all votes cast,"8 since it is mathematically possible for more candidates than there are vacancies to receive, respectively, votes aggregating a number which is the same as or greater than the number
representing a majority of the shares voted.7T
It is possible that strict application of the just discussed plurality rule to determine the results of elections of directors at which
votes were cast cumulatively may be in derogation of statutes of
the type applicable to the affairs of national banking associations 8
45
Wright v. Central California Water Co., (1885) 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac.
70. In Bridgers v. Staton, (1909) 150 N. C. 216, 63 S. E. 892, while
passing upon the propriety of a demand for cumulative voting upon the
question of adjourning a stockholders' meeting, the court pointed out:
" . . . It was impossible for him to vote cumulative upon a single
proposition. It is only when several persons are voted for at the same
time that the voter can 'cumulate' his votes."
The logical necessity for one ballot upon more than one question in
order that cumulative voting be possible was met in an interesting fashion
by the draftsmen of the Michigan statute authorizing cumulative voting upon
the question of removal of directors (Public Acts, 1931, Act. No. 327,
sec. 13) cited supra (footnote 4). Apparently the statute contemplates
cumulation through multiplication of a number equal to shares held by a
number equal to directors (including the impeached) elected for the same
term as the impeached. If votes sufficient to elect a director at an election
of a full board are recorded against the removal, the impeached incumbent
may not be removed. Once shares have been cumulatively voted in this
fashion they cannot be voted on the question of removing any other director
elected for said term.
46Schwartz v. State ex rel. Schwartz, (1900) 61 Ohio St. 497, 56 N. E.
201. In South Dakota, where cumulative voting is provided for by a constitutional provision of the "mandatory" type (constitution, art. XVII, sec.
5), a statute provides that "a vote of stockholders representing a majority
is necessary to a choice" (Rev. Code of
of the subscribed capital stock
1919, sec. 8787).
47
For instance, in an election of five directors by shareholders of a
corporation having 100 shares outstanding and entitled to vote where the
voting is on the cumulative plan, it is theoretically possible that out of the
total of 500 votes which may be cast nine candidates will each receive 51 votes
or, in other words, a number equal to the number constituting a majority
of 100 shares.
48U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5146 (12 U.S.C.A. sec. 72, 1 Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 12, sec. 72) as amended.
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which require that a certain number or proportion of the directors
elected possess residential qualifications.
Apparently the only case involving such a situation is a
Kansas decision 41 which is not particularly illuminating for present
purposes. The case came before the court on a writ of quo
warranto secured to test the right of three Kansas residents to
hold office as directors of a Kansas corporation. The opinion
indicates that at a meeting of the stockholders held prior to the
commencement of legal proceedings a ballot was taken for the
election of a board of eleven directors after the chairman of the
meeting had called to the attention of assembled stockholders two
separate provisions of Kansas law, one of which accorded the
privilege of cumulative voting, and the other of which required
that at least three directors be citizens or residents of the state.
Two opposing factions voted cumulatively, one faction concentrating the distribution of its votes among six non-resident candidates,
and the other among five non-resident candidates, although each
faction cast a few scattered votes for residents. When the vote
was tabulated it was found that three Kansas residents had received 16, 6 and 8 votes, respectively, and that eleven non-resident
candidates had polled votes varying in number from 78,493 to
103,850. The chairman of the meeting declared the three resident
candidates and the eight non-resident candidates receiving the
highest number of votes to have been duly elected. The quo
warranto proceeding was thereafter instituted by the three nonresident candidates who had each received more votes than the
residents who were declared elected.
The actual decision of the court appears to have been that it
would not exercise discretionary power to remove the residents
from office in accordance with the only request for relief made by
plaintiffs. There is reason to believe that the court, in so ruling
on the only request for relief before it, did not wish to inspire any
inference that it approved the methods followed in electing directors and declaring the results of the poll, for it was carefully
pointed out that had the court been requested to set aside the
election "it is the opinion of the writer that the conduct of the
e!ection by both parties was such as to defeat its validity." Unfortunately, however, the court omitted indication of any method
for avoiding in all cases potential conflicts between the plurality
rule incident to cumulative voting and statutes defining residential
requirements applicable to a part but not all of the membership of a
49Horton v. Wilder, (1892) 48 Kan. 222, 29 Pac. 566.
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board of directors. It repeated an obviously accurate observation
that "the advantage of cumulative voting will be greatly restricted
by the election of two classes of directors, resident and non-resident"; stated that cumulative voting statutes and those defining
residential requirements for directors "must be construed together,
and effect given to both"; pointed out that there would be no difficulty in this connection "except where non-resident directors are
to be chosen"; and voiced the opinion that "where both resident
and non-resident directors are to be voted for, that method of
cumulative voting must be employed by which at least three residents and citizens shall be elected."
Notwithstanding the inconclusive language of the opinion just
summarized, one regards it as some indication that statutes defining residential requirements for directors are controlling, and
properly should require a modified application of the plurality
rule incident to cumulative voting in all cases of conflict. It
seems likely that the number of such conflicts will be small, because they arise only in those instances where votes are cast
preponderantly for non-residents, and can be avoided by majority
interests which judiciously apportion votes between residents and
non-residents.
The principles applied by the chairman of the meeting to determine the result of the election litigated in the Kansas case appear
to be reasonable, notwithstanding the failure of the court to approve them, for they simply contemplate that residentially qualified candidates will first be declared elected to fill so many of the
vacancies as the law requires to be filled by persons so qualified,
in order of plurality over other similarly qualified candidates, and
that then other candidates will be declared elected to the extent of
the remaining vacancies in order of plurality, irrespective of residence. In the event that there are fewer residentially qualified
candidates receiving votes than there are vacancies which the
law requires to be filled by persons so qualified, it seems proper,
as well as consistent with the "second ballot" rule discussed in the
succeeding paragraph, that any residentially qualified candidates
receiving votes be declared elected, and another ballot or other ballots be taken to fill all remaining vacancies. On the second and
succeeding ballots the plurality rule should be applied exclusively
between residentially qualified candidates only to the extent that
vacancies remain to be filled by persons so qualified. The existence
and potential applicability of these principles might furnish every
incentive to voting factions to distribute their votes judiciously

CUMULATIVE VOTING

among resident as well as non-resident candidates in the first
instance, in order to eliminate any necessity for a second ballot
on which their ability to elect candidates might be impaired as a
result of a reduction in the number of vacancies to be filled on that
ballot.
As might be expected, cumulation of votes and distribution
thereof among a number of candidates greater than the total which
the aggregate of cumulated votes can elect over any and all opposition has sometimes resulted in a tie vote between candidates
numbering more than the total of the vacancies available. In
such situations the proper procedure is to take another ballot or
other ballots to fill only those vacancies affected by the tie.50 The
privilege of voting cumulatively is not exhausted by the first ballot, but may be exercised on succeeding ballots.5'
Should a meeting of stockholders be concluded before all
directorate vacancies have been filled as a result of an election
which was part of the business of the meeting, a variety of results
may follow. In the comparatively rare instance where no vacancies are filled because opposing factions control the same number
of votes, with the consequence that no candidate receives a plurality,
the old board holds over.5 2 Where balloting results in the election of part but not a quorum of the board of directors before conclusion of the meeting, the old board holds over also. 53 Where,
however, vacancies are filled to a number equaling a quorum, the
old board is displaced, even though unfilled vacancies exist at the
time the meeting concludes.54
-oState ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919)

100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E.

87; Forsyth
v. Brown, (Pa. 1893) 33 W. N. 72.
51State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E.

87, where the court said it had "no hesitancy in holding that the language
and purpose of the statute is to permit the privilege of cumulative voting to
all of the shareholders, not only on the first, but on successive ballots, where
'directors are to be elected.'" See also Forsyth v. Brown, (Pa. 1893) 33
W. N.2 72.
1 Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co. v. Burrows, (1908) 144 Ill.
App. 350. There seems to be no reason why this rule should not be
applicable to all elections of directors, whether or not the voting is on the
cumulative
plan.
53
See State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126
N. E. 87, where it was said that if "the second ballot taken at the annual
election . . . is invalid, it is manifest that the two persons receiving the
majority on the first ballot cannot be inducted into office, and that the old
board would remain until their successors are legally chosen." Here again
the rule is one properly applicable to all elections whether or not the
voting is on the cumulative plan. See Matter of Union Insurance Company,
(1840) 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 591, where it was said that if "less than twelve,
'the major part of twenty-three,' had received a plurality of votes, it may
be that the whole election would have been void." Cf. Gilchrist v. Collopy,
(1904) 119 Ky. 110, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1003, 82 S. W. 1018.
54Wright v. Commonwealth, (1885) 109 Pa. St. 560, 1 Atl. 794; For-
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One need look no further than the reported cases for illustrations of situations in which a misunderstanding or disregard of
the legal rules applicable to, and mathematical principles underlying, cumulative voting may lead to results not contemplated by
the framers of legislation granting or providing for the privilege.
It is perfectly possible, for instance, that an unwary majority
stock interest may lose control of the board to a cumulatively voting minority stock interest. At least three judicial decisions are
evidence of one method by which a minority achieved this result.
In Pierce v. Commionwealth,55 it appeared that at an election of a
board of six directors an aggregate of 6,433 shares out of a total
of 7,000 were voted by two opposing factions as indicated below:
Stockholders

Total Total
Shares Votes--A

Distribution of Votes by Candidates
B

C

D

E

F

Majority
Group .....

3,396 20,376 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396

Minority
Group.

3,037 18.222

Totals....

G

H

I

J

4,557 4,556 4,555 4,552

6,433 38,598 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 4,557 4,556 4,555 4,552

Candidates G, H, I and J were declared elected and, in view of
the fact that they constituted a quorum, the old board was probably displaced." An Illinois decision 5 7 indicates that a majority
interest lost control of a board of three directors in similar fashion,
though it controlled 511 out of the 999 shares represented at the
meeting. The following is a tabulation of the vote as the facts
indicate it probably was cast:
Stockholders
Majority Group ....
Minority Group ....
Totals ..........

Total
Shares

Total
Votes

511

1533

488

1464

999

2997

Distribution of Votes by Candidates
A

B

C

511

511

511
775

689

511

511

1266

689

D

Candidate C, minority stock owner, and his nominee, candidate
syth v. Brown, (Pa. 1893) 33 W. N. 72; see State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul,

(1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E. 87 and Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing
Company v. Boggiano, (1903) 202 Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17. This rule applies
as well to elections of directors where cumulative voting is not employed.
Matter of Union Insurance Co., (1840) 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 591; Matter of
Excelsior Insurance Co., (1862) 38 Barb. (N.Y.) 297, 16 Abb. Prac. 8.
55(1883) 104 Pa. St. 150.
56See supra, footnote 54 and text.
57
Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing Company v. Boggiano, (1903) 202
Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17.
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D, were declared elected. The Ohio decision of Schwartz v. State
ex rel. Schwartz"8 involved a situation and result analogous to the
two just reviewed. It is apparent that in each of these situations
the majority erred in that it voted its stock non-cumulatively,
against cumulatively voting minority interests. In each instance
the majority, by cumulating and properly distributing its votes,
could have secured control of the board of directors. The requirement of certain statutes that stockholders give advance notice or
warning of their intention to vote cumulatively59 probably was inspired by a desire to avoid the inequitable result illustrated by these
cases. 10
Another method by which a majority interest might conceivably lose control is by permitting minority interests to "creep"
on successive ballots. A fact situation involved in an Ohio case'
furnishes an indication of this possibility, but is not precisely
illustrative because the opposing factions happened to be of equal
strength, and because one faction withdrew from the meeting after
the first ballot. For purposes of illustration, however, let it be
assumed that all of the 100 shares of a corporation outstanding
and entitled to vote are represented at a meeting called for the
purpose of electing five directors and that opposing factions hold
60 and 40 shares, respectively. On the first ballot, if the majority
divides its 300 votes evenly among more than three candidates
(enough to constitute a majority of the board) the minority by
dividing its 200 votes evenly between two other candidates can
elect them. On the second ballot, required as a result of the tie of
four or more majority interest candidates for three vacancies, 2
the minority interest can elect one additional candidate over any
and all opposition by casting for him the 120 votes to which it is
entitled on a cumulative basis.6"
88(1900) 61 Ohio St. 497, 56 N. E. 201.
59

See supra, footnote 38 and text.
aO0ne of the notes of the Drafting Committee, incorporated in a reprint
of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act published under the auspices of
the Minnesota State Bar Association, contains the following statement with
reference to the requirement of said Act that notice be given of an intention
to vote cumulatively:
" . . . But cumulative voting, unless it is known to the shareholders
that it will actually be followed, may lead to minority control if the minority
is organized and votes cumulatively, and the majority i3 not so organized
and does not know that the minority proposes to cumulate its votes. ...
By the provisions here recommended all shareholders present at the meeting will know that cumulative voting is to be followed by at least some
shareholders, and can protect themselves accordingly."
of the
8
3State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E. 87.
2
6 See supra, footnote 50 and text.
OsSee supra, footnote 51 and text.
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It is likewise possible that an unwary minority interest may
lose a part of the representation on the board of directors which
its votes could elect if cumulated and distributed properly. A
California case 8 involved a fact situation which illustrates this
possibility. At an election of five directors, shareholders owning
100 shares in the aggregate distributed votes among themselves
as indicated below:
Stockholders

Total
Shares

44
B.D. ..........
..........
25
E.G.DJE.........4
G.G.G..........
25
L.C .............
i.W...........1
Totals .......

1

Distribution of Votes by Candidates

Total

Votes

220
24
125
125
5
5
00

B.D.C.

L.C.

J.W.

73%4

73M

73

1
134

1
134

75

80%

4

G.G.G.

J.E.A.

E.G.D.

4
413
413

4
4134
4134

41

8734

8734

873

134
134
1 803

It will be noted that B.D.C., the largest single stockholder, with a
44 per cent minority interest, failed of election solely because he
distributed the votes, which he had cumulated, among candidates
numbering one more than such votes would elect over any and all
opposition.
Naturally enough, a majority interest faction which finds that
it has beeii or is likely to be out-maneuvered by minority interests
through failure to cumulate and distribute votes properly is likely to seek some method of correcting the situation. One of the
simplest expedients which might occur to a stockholder under such
circumstances is that of correcting his ballot. So long as the
polls remain open, there appears to be no legal objection to this
action. 5 The rule appears to be otherwise, however, where the
polls have been closed. 6 Conceivably, also, the majority interest
faction might attempt to hold the election over again. Two cases
have been found which involve situations where the latter tactical
approach was employed while the meeting was still in session, and
which apparently hold that such strategy is legally permissible. 1
'3Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., (1894) 103 Cal. 357, 35 Pac. 1045.
OZierath Combination Drill Co. v. Croake, (1913) 21 Cal. App. 222,
131 Pac. 335, where the court said that "before the final vote was cast,
and before any canvass or result of election was announced, it was proper to
permit the correction of the ballots that they might express the true
intention of the stockholders." State ex rel. Lawrence v. McGann, (1895)
64 Mo. App. 225.
- 8See Commonwealth ex rel. James v. Blatchford, (1876) 21 Pa. Dist.

453.

67State ex rel. Springs v. Ellison, (1916) 106 S. C. 139, 90 S. E. 699,
13 A. L. R. 130 and In re P. B. Mathiason Manufacturing Co., (1907) 122
Mo. App. 437, 99 S. W. 502. In Clark v. Wild, (1911) 85 Vt. 212, 81
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If it be established doctrine that a majority can vacate an election
and hold it over again, the rule is probably subject to the qualification that the second ballot be for the same number of directors.
Otherwise, by repealing the results of the earlier ballot only to the
extent that minority candidates were successful, a majority could
prevent minority representation. 8
Reconciliation of a rule which permits stockholders by a vote
of a majority to set aside the results of a vote for directors and
hold the election over again with other legal principles applicable
to the election and incumbency of directors involves a number of
interesting speculations: first, is the rule one which can be invoked
for the sole purpose of correcting situations in which the majority
by failure to cumulate and distribute votes properly has failed to
secure the directorate representation to which it is entitled and, if
so, are there limits on the time within which the majority can exercise the privilege accorded by the rule; second, is the rule based
upon the proposition that the closing of the polls and announcement
of the result of the ballot are not determinative of a director's
election and, if so, when can it be said, conclusively, that a director
has been elected; and third, is it possible that the rule permits
stockholders who have just elected directors to reverse their action
immediately by removing such directors from office without cause?
Unfortunately the cases which seem to establish the rule answer
none of the questions just posed. One might be inclined to justify
such a rule as an exceptional doctrine designed solely to permit a
majority to procure the representation to which it is lawfully
entitled, if it were not for the fact that the rule would be a
standing invitation to majority interest factions to devote one ballot to an attempt to elect more directors than their votes entitle
them to without risking loss of proportionate representation in
case the attempt fails. Though there exists some authority indicating that stockholders may reverse action previously taken by
them 9 there are decisions indicating with some clarity that in the
Atl. 536, the resolution recording the determination of stockholders to hold

an election of directors over again assigned illegality of the first vote as
a reason for such action. This reason the court found not to be based on
fact and because of this circumstance the second ballot was held to be invalid.88
See Commonwealth ex rel. Oler v. Gutman, (1927) 10 Pa. Dist. &
Co. 606, where the court said that majority stockholders "cannot be permitted
to defeat the right of the minority to representation on the board by arbitrarily declaring three vacancies to have existed when there were no vacancies, and by again cumulating their votes elect an entire board of their
choosing and defeat the right of minority stockholders to be represented on
the board."
8
aTerry v. Eagle Lock Company, (1879) 47 Conn. 141, holding that at
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case of elections of directors at which the voting is on the cumulative plan the close of the polls and tabulation of the result of the
ballot is the determinant of a director's election.70 Of course, if
the result of cases holding that a majority of stockholders can
effectively act to hold an election of directors over again is to be
explained on the ground that the courts in those cases simply
upheld the right of stockholders to remove just elected directors
from office, the value of these cases as precedents ought to be considered in the light of principles pertaining generally to the removal
of directors, a subject next discussed.
In at least four states statutes which permit stockholders to
remove directors are expressly qualified so as to prevent use of
removal proceedings by a majority interest faction for the purpose
of eliminating minority representation on the board of directors. 71
a subsequent meeting stockholders may repeal authorization for a stock
increase; Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, (1863) 20 Md. 117,
where the court indicated that stockholders still in session had power to
repeal confirmation of a contract to which the corporation was a party;
see note, 13 A. L. R. 131.
70 State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N. E.
87; Forsyth v. Brown, (Pa. 1893) 33 W. N. 72; Wright v. Commonwealth,
(1885) 109 Pa. St. 560, 1 Atl. 794. The cases just cited are the genesis of
the "second ballot" rule (see supra, footnotes 50 and 51 and text). From
a logical standpoint it seems necessary to premise said rule on the proposition
that the close of the polls and tabulation of the results of the ballot determine whether or not a candidate has been elected.
Conceivably, if conclusion of the stockholders' meeting without reversal
of action taken thereat is the determinant of a director's election, the election of a new board might be postponed indefinitely by adjourning the
meeting pro tempore from time to time, since subsequent sessions after
such an adjournment are merely continuations of the original meeting
(see Shaw v. Tati Concessions, Ltd., [1913] 1 Ch. 292, 82 L. J. Ch. 159;
McLaren v. Thomson, [1917] 2 Ch. 261, 117 L. T. 417). In West Side
Hospital v. Steel, (1906) 124 Ill. App. 535, it was held that a majority stock
interest could not adjourn the annual meeting of stockholders pro tempore
before the scheduled election of directors took place in order that retiring
directors could elect officers for the coming year in the interim before the
date of the adjourned session. The basis of the decision was that adjournment operated to deprive stockholders of the opportunity to exercise effectively the cumulative voting privilege.
7"Minnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 300, sec. 28; California, Civil Code, sec.
310; Michigan, Public Acts 1931, Act No. 327, sec. 13; Pennsylvania,
Laws 1933, Act No. 106, sec. 405. The Minnesota statute provides that
"unless the entire board be removed, no individual director shall be removed in case the votes of a sufficient number of shares are cast against
his removal, which if then cumulatively voted at an election of a full board
would be sufficient to elect him." The California and Pennsylvania statutes
are similarly phrased. The Michigan statute is discussed in footnote 45. A
provision such as that just quoted from the Minnesota statutes, when
coupled with a cumulative voting enactment of the "mandatory" type,
might have unfortunate consequences in certain conceivable situations. A
minority stockholder might be able, for instance, to continue himself in office
as a director in spite of the fact that his derelictions of duty eminently
justified attempts to remove him.
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Oddly enough, in several states where there exist cumulative voting provisions of the "mandatory" type there also exist statutes
which expressly and without qualification seem to permit a specified majority of the stockholders (usually two-thirds) and, in
some instances, the directors, to remove directors from office. 72 In
some of these states where the cumulative voting privilege is
conferred by constitution, 3 statutes pertaining to removal of
directors might properly be held subordinate to the purpose underlying the provision of the constitution and, therefore, inapplicable
to minority interest directors who are innocent of official misconduct.74 Unless legislation be supplemented by "judge made
law" based on the theory just outlined or another theory productive of the same ultimate result, it is conceivable that a majority
stock interest, through removal proceedings authorized by statute
in these states, could effectively eliminate minority representation
on the board of directors obtained through exercise of the cumulative voting privilege granted by constitution or statute.
Another type of enactment which contemplates removal of
directors for cause through judicial proceedings 75 might be practically adequate to safeguard minority interest representation on a
board of directors, if it were not for the possibility that this type
of enactment may not be held to define the exclusive method by
which directors may be removed from office prior to the expiration
of the term for which they were elected." In states where there
are no statutes regulating in express terms the removal of directors
from office without cause prior to the expiration of the terms for
which they were elected, it is entirely possible that common law
principles may prevent elimination of minority representation on
hoards of directors through removal proceedings instituted by a
majority stock interest, since there are precedents indicating that
72
daho, Code 1932, Title 29, sec. 29-138; Montana, Rev. Code of 1935,
sec. 5940; North Dakota, Comp. Laws of 1913, sec. 4546; South Dakota,

Rev. Code of 1919, sec. 8791; Washington, Remington's Rev. Stat. 1932, sec.
3803-31
73 or Pierce's Code 1933, sec. 4592-61.

Idaho, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota-see supra, footnote 76.4
See supra, footnotes 30 to 35 and text.
7
GThe following are examples: Alaska, Comp. Laws of 1933, Title 2.
ch. XI, art. II, sec. 918; Missouri, Rev. Codes of 1935, sec. 4959; New York,
Cahill's
Consolidated Laws, ch. 24 (General Corporation Law), secs. 60-61.
7
01n People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, (1911) 201 N. Y. 194, 94 N. E.
634, the court said with respect to the provision of New York law cited
in the previous footnote:
"... The statute providing for an action in the name of the attorneygeneral to suspend or remove a director is not exclusive of such reasonable
and lawful charter provision relating thereto as may be included in the
articles of incorporation. ..."
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in the absence of statutory authority a director cannot be removed
from office without cause prior to the expiration of his term
78
by his fellow directors 77 or by vote of the stockholders.
A few comments summarizing certain personal ideas about
cumulative voting legislation are probably not out of order. It
is difficult to quarrel with the purpose underlying such enactments,
for minority representation on boards of directors seems desirable.
It needs to be remembered, however, that the purpose probably
cannot be effectuated in many instances because of practical
obstacles. Particularly does this seem true in the case of large
corporations, for any one conversant with difficulties attending
solicitation of proxies appreciates that a formidable task confronts
a militant minority leader desirous of obtaining proxies covering
enough shares to elect a minority representative or representatives
to the directorate of a large corporation, the stock of which is
widely held. For instance, a survey of the ownership of stock of
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, American Telephone &
Telegraph Company and United States Steel Corporation, as of
1929, developed that in each case the largest individual holding
amounted to less than one per cent of the outstanding stock; that
the aggregate holdings of the twenty largest shareholders were
respectively 2.7 per cent, 4 per cent and 5.1 per cent; and that in
all there were 196,119 stockholders of the railroad, approximately
a half million owning stock in the telephone company and 182,585
holders of steel stock.7 9 In the same year (1929) it appears that
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company had seventeen directors, 0
American Telephone & Telegraph Company had either nineteen or
7
TBruch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., (1922) 13 Del. Ch. 180,
116 Atl. 738; Laughlin v. Geer, 1905) 121 Ill. App. 534; see Stott v. Stott
Realty Company, (1929) 246 Mich. 267, 224 N. W. 623, 63 A. L. R. 774,
and note, 63 A. L. R. 776.
-8State ex rel. Koski v. Kylmanen, (1929) 178 Minn. 164, 226 N. W.
401; Toledo Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Smith, (D.C. Ohio 1913) 205
Fed. 643; Powers v. Blue Grass Building & Loan Ass'n, (C.C. Ky. 1898) 86
Fed. 705; Nathan v. Tompkins, (1887) 82 Ala. 437, 2 So. 747. In New
York it appears that provision for removal of directors by stockholders
without cause may be made in the charter (see People ex rel. Manice v.
Powell, (1911) 201 N. Y. 194, 94 N. E. 634) and, perhaps, in the by-laws
(see Matter of Automotive Manufacturers Association, (1923) 120 Misc.
Rep. 405, 199 N. Y. S. 313; Fox v. Cody, (1930) 141 Misc. Rep. 552, 252
N. Y. S. 395; Abberger v. Kulp, (1935) 156 Misc. Rep. 210, 281 N. Y. S.
373).

7
9See
8

Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, 47-48.
OMoody's Manual of Investments, Railroad Securities, (1929) p. 588
and (1930) p. 704. The 1936 edition of this manual lists the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company as having seventeen directors (p. 1402) and indicates that
as of July 31, 1936, there were 222,999 holders of the stock (p. 1426).

CUMULATIVE VOTING

twenty directors"" and United States Steel Corporation had either
fourteen or fifteen directors.8 2 It can be realized, accordingly, that
on the basis of this information it would have been mathematically
impossible for the twenty largest stockholders of any of these
companies to elect a single director through the process of cumulating their votes and casting all of them for the same candidate
if all other stockholders had united in opposition. The minority
leader's task is not rendered any less difficult by the fact that a
management group, intent on electing a full slate of directors, has
a tremendous advantage, in that it is in position to forward its own
proxy to stockholders along with. notice of the stockholders' meeting at corporate expense, a general practice which is tolerated
by the courts.8 3 As has been remarked, "stockholders in large
corporations are, as a matter of common knowledge, generally
uninformed and in a measure indifferent concerning the management of the corporation. Generally, without inquiry, they sign
proxies as a matter of course so that directors and officers may be
re-elected and their policies may be continued."84 It seems to be
a fair conclusion, in view of the foregoing, that cumulative voting
is likely to be most useful as a privilege in the case of corporations
whose stock is concentrated in the hands of relatively few individuals divided or divisible into groups with aggregate holdings,
in each case, constituting a respectable proportion of the total
amount of stock outstanding.
81
Moody's Manual of Investments, Public Utility Securities, (1929)
p. 204 and (1930) p. 11. The 1936 edition of this manual lists American
Telephone & Telegraph Company as having nineteen directors (p. 141)
and indicates that as of December 31, 1935, there were 657,465 holders of
its stock
(p. 148).
82
Moody's Manual of Investments, Industrial Securities, (1929) p.
320 and (1930) p. 131. The 1936 edition of this manual lists United States
Steel Corporation as having fifteen directors (p. 1908) and indicates that
at about March 7, 1936, there were 244,193 holders of its stock (p. 1913).
83
See Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., (1934) 20
Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226; Lawyers Advertising Company v. Consolidated
Railway, Lighting & Refrigerating Company, (1907) 187 N. Y. 395, 80
N. E. 199; Peel v. London & Northwestern Railway Company, [1907] 1
Ch. Div. 5; 76 L. J. Ch. 152; cf. Rascovor v. American Linseed Company,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1905) 135 Fed. 341. Rule LA3 of the Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under date of January 24, 1936,
requires disclosure of certain information by those soliciting proxies in
respect of any non-exempt security listed on a national securities exchange
by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.
Among other things, Rule LA3 requires those soliciting proxies on behalf
of the management to disclose that fact.
84

Davis, J., in Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., (1934) 240

App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y. S. 360, leave to appeal denied (1934) 241 App.
Div. 745, 270 N. Y. S.961.
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Cumulative voting enactments of the "mandatory" type seem
to be preferable to those which fall within the "permissive" classification. While it is possible to conceive of situations in which
the grant of the privilege of voting cumulatively might turn out
to be valueless or a needless refinement, it is difficult to imagine
any situation in which that privilege would be a burden or handicap to persons other than those comprising a majority group which
desires to exclude the minority from any participation in the
management of corporate affairs in derogation of the very purpose underlying such enactments. This being the case, if the
privilege is to be granted at all, the grant should not be at the
will of incorporators who may compose the majority group, nor
should a majority be afforded the opportunity to withdraw any
such grant at its pleasure by amending the corporate charter or
by-laws. 85
85
In Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, (1929) 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147
Atl. 255 it was held that Delaware law permitted amendment of the
charter of a Delaware corporation so as to repeal a provision authorizing
cumulative voting. Section 36 of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act
(Laws 1933, ch. 300) appears to authorize holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock to achieve the same result.

